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Executive Summary 
The British Columbia Report.  In October 2004, the Information and Privacy Commis-
sioner of British Columbia, Canada, issued a report arguing that there is a “reasonable possibil-
ity” that the U.S. government will use section 215 of the USA Patriot Act to obtain access to per-
sonal health data about British Columbia residents if those data are outsourced to “US-linked” 
companies in Canada.2  The report concluded that such access would violate provincial privacy 
law. 
As a result, the report recommended that British Columbia prohibit personal information 
held by the public sector from being transferred to, or accessed from, outside of Canada, and 
block companies that process personal data for public bodies from complying with other nations’ 
laws or judicial orders seeking those data “punishable by a fine of up to $1 million or a signifi-
cant term of imprisonment, or both.”  The report recommended that the Canadian government 
implement similar requirements on the national level and also “address the implications of the 
USA Patriot Act for the security of personal information that is entrusted to private sector cus-
tody or control.” 
The British Columbia Privacy Law.  The government of British Columbia did not wait 
for the Commissioner’s report to be published before taking action.  In October 2004 the Legisla-
tive Assembly adopted a law requiring each public body to ensure that “personal information in 
its custody or under its control is stored only in Canada and accessed only in Canada.”3 
The law also requires a public body or its service provider to notify “the minister respon-
sible for this Act” if it receives “a foreign demand” for personal information, if it receives a re-
quest for disclosure that “it has reason to suspect” is for disclosure outside of Canada, or if it 
“has reason to suspect that unauthorized disclosure of personal information has occurred in re-
sponse to a foreign demand for disclosure.” 
The Flaws of the British Columbia Approach.  The British Columbia report and pri-
vacy law are seriously flawed and have contributed to misfocusing the growing debate over pri-
vacy issues in multinational information flows.  Among the issues addressed below: 
• They ignore the fact that section 215 of the USA Patriot Act has only been used 35 times 
since being expanded in 2001, is very unlikely to be used to attempt to access Canadian’s 
records being processed in the United States, and is already governed by the Mutual Le-
gal Assistance Treaty between Canada and the United States if it were to be invoked. 
• They ignore the requirement in British Columbia law that privacy protections only be 
“reasonable,” not perfect or complete, and the exceptions in the law that permit transfers 
of personal data for important reasons, such as national security or law enforcement. 
                                                 
2 Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Impli-
cations for British Columbia Public Sector Outsourcing (Oct. 2004). 
3 Bill 73—the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Amendment Act, 2004. 
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• The report focuses on privacy and downplays security, thereby threatening to compro-
mise the latter by overprotecting the former. 
• The report focuses exclusively on U.S. companies with Canadian subsidiaries, thus ignor-
ing the reality that any threat to Canadian data posed by section 215 or other provisions 
of U.S. law, however slight that may be, is posed equally against Canadian companies 
with U.S. subsidiaries or service providers. 
• The report and privacy law pose real threats to individuals and businesses.  Multinational 
companies are reporting stringent new terms being added to Canadian and provincial 
government outsourcing contracts forbidding personal data from being transferred to, or 
accessed from, the United States; prohibiting the involvement of U.S. employees of ser-
vice providers; and even requiring restructuring of multinational business entities.  In the 
case of the British Columbia health benefits administration contract that sparked the re-
port and the new law, the government required the winning bidder to create a new British 
Columbia subsidiary to carry out the contract, and required that the stock of the new sub-
sidiary be placed in a trust, with the shares to be handed over to the government—along 
with a $35 million penalty—in the event personal data are transferred, or accessed from, 
outside of Canada. 
• Most importantly, the report and the law adopt a provincial solution to a global issue.  
Prohibiting the transfer of personal data to, or access from, outside of Canada is simply 
not a workable approach for the information age.  It denies the efficiencies and econo-
mies of scale that global information flows make possible. 
Future Risks and the Need for a New, Multinational Approach.  The British Colum-
bia report and law are only a start.  Other provinces, the Canadian federal government, and other 
countries in Europe and Asia are also examining the potential impact of the USA Patriot Act on 
outsourcing arrangements involving the personal information of their residents.  Many other na-
tions, including Canada, have laws similar to the USA Patriot Act that provide limited access to 
personal data, with judicial authorization, for national security purposes.  If the British Columbia 
approach extends to other nations’ laws and spreads across Canada, across sectors, and ulti-
mately across the globe, multinational data flows will be severely threatened. 
The harm to individuals and institutions of the British Columbia approach to data protec-
tion is already clear.  If magnified across provinces and nations, and applied to private- as well as 
public-sector data processing, the impact could be extraordinary.  It will be measured not only in 
terms of economics and convenience, but jobs, health, and security.  Such a serious, multina-
tional issue requires a serious, multinational response, not the unilateral, provincial legislation 
adopted by British Columbia. 
The critical issues highlighted by the British Columbia report and law, and especially the 
question about how to deal with divergent national legal systems that increasingly come into 
conflict as data move across national borders, warrant thoughtful consideration.  While the con-
cerns are not new, powerful information technologies, global networks, and the multinational 
commerce, outsourcing, and information sharing they have made possible are inevitably going to 
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cause new and more frequent conflicts between divergent national (and provincial) approaches to 
privacy and information management.  Those same technologies and activities, our growing reli-
ance on them, and the important values they implicate—including privacy and security—also 
heighten the urgency of finding multinational, diplomatic solutions that protect global informa-
tion flows. 
 
  
LEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS 
TO PREVENT GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PERSONAL DATA: 
LESSONS FROM BRITISH COLUMBIA 
The British Columbia Report 
In October 2004, the Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia issued 
a report, Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Implications for British Columbia Public Sector Out-
sourcing.4  The report concluded a six-month inquiry into two issues: (1) whether the USA Pa-
triot Act5 would permit U.S. government access to British Columbian health records that had 
been outsourced to “US-linked private sector service providers”; and (2) if it does, whether this 
violates the British Columbia Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FOIPPA).6 
The inquiry had been sparked by a lawsuit by the British Columbia Government and Ser-
vice Employees’ Union.  The union had sought to block the provincial government from con-
tracting out administration of its public sector health program The lawsuit alleged, among other 
charges, that contracting out the administrative role to a company linked to the United States 
would threaten the privacy of public sector employees and violate British Columbian law by sub-
jecting their health data to possible seizure under the USA Patriot Act.7 
The primary focus of the privacy concerns was section 215 of the USA Patriot Act, which 
amended a 1978 law empowering senior FBI officials to apply to the U.S. Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court for a secret order requiring the disclosure of certain business records in con-
nection with foreign intelligence and terrorism investigations.8  The USA Patriot Act, adopted in 
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, expanded the scope of those orders so 
that they could be used to obtain “any tangible thing” from any individual or entity subject to the 
court’s jurisdiction, as part of “an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clan-
destine intelligence activities.”9 
The October British Columbia report was far-reaching and extended well beyond the two 
questions on which Commissioner David Loukidellis had sought public input.  On the first of 
those questions, however, the report concluded that there is a “reasonable possibility” that the 
U.S. government will use section 215 of the USA Patriot Act to obtain access to personal health 
                                                 
4 Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, Privacy and the USA Patriot Act: Impli-
cations for British Columbia Public Sector Outsourcing (Oct. 2004). 
5 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Ob-
struct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
6 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 165. 
7 British Columbia Government & Service Employees’ Union v. the Minister of Health Services and the 
Medical Services Commission, 2005 B.C.S.C. 446, 2005 B.C.D. Civ. J. 1807. 
8 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215. 
9 Id. 
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data about British Columbia residents if those data are outsourced to “US-linked” companies in 
Canada.10 
In response to the second question, the report concluded that such access violates two 
provisions of provincial privacy law.11  Section 30 of FOIPPA requires the government to protect 
personal information in its custody or under its control by making “reasonable security arrange-
ments against such risks as unauthorized access, collection, use, disclosure or disposal.”12  Sec-
tion 33 prohibits disclosure of personal data by the government unless specifically authorized by 
one of the specified exemptions.  At the time the report was written, those exemptions included 
“in accordance with a provision or a treaty, arrangement or agreement,” “for the purpose of 
complying with a subpoena, warrant, or order issued by a court, person or body with jurisdiction 
to compel the production of the information,” or “to a law enforcement agency in a foreign coun-
try under an arrangement, written agreement, treaty or legislative authority.”13 
The report found that U.S. law—and the law of other Canadian provinces and “possibly” 
even of Canada itself14—could never be sufficient to “authorize” disclosure under either section 
30 or 33, and that the risk of disclosure under the USA Patriot Act is too great to allow data 
about British Columbia residents to come within the Act’s reach.  According to the report, “sov-
ereignty and territoriality,” as well as “privacy,” demand that for privacy purposes, British Co-
lumbia prohibit at least personal data held by or for the public sector from being exported to or 
even accessed from outside of Canada. 
The report concluded with 16 recommendations.  The most important and immediate of 
these would amend FOIPPA to: 
• “pending nation-to-nation agreement [see below], . . . prohibit personal information in the 
custody or under the control of a public body from being temporarily or permanently sent 
outside Canada for management, storage or safekeeping”;15 
• “pending nation-to-nation agreement [see below], . . . prohibit personal information in the 
custody or under the control of a public body from being . . . accessed outside Canada”;16 
                                                 
10 Privacy and the USA Patriot Act, supra at 18. 
11 Id. at 17, 115-16. 
12 FOIPPA, supra § 30. 
13 Id. §§ 33(d), (e), (o). After the report was prepared, FOIPPA was amended to permit disclosure “to 
comply with a subpoena, warrant or order issued or made by a court, person or body in Canada with jurisdiction to 
compel the production of information,” id. § 33.2(b), and “to a law enforcement agency in a foreign country under 
an arrangement, a written agreement, a treaty or provincial or Canadian legislative authority,” but only by a “public 
body that is a law enforcement agency.” Id. § 33.1(2).  
14 Privacy and the USA Patriot Act, supra at 107. 
15 Id. at 134 (Rec. 1(a)). 
16 Id. at 134-35 (Rec. 1(a)). 
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• “require a contractor to a public body to notify the public body of any subpoena, warrant, 
order, demand or request made by a foreign court or other foreign authority for the dis-
closure of personal information” about British Columbians, even if doing so violates the 
national law to which the contractor is subject;17 
• “make it an offense under FOIPPA for a public body or a contractor to a public body to 
use or disclose personal information, or send it outside Canada, in contravention of 
FOIPPA”—even if in response to “a subpoena, warrant, order, demand, or request by a 
court or other authority,” unless “it is a Canadian court, or other Canadian authority”—
“punishable by a fine of up to $1 million or a significant term of imprisonment, or 
both”;18 and 
• empower the Commissioner to be able to “enter contractor premises, obtain and copy re-
cords, and order compliance,” apparently without first obtaining a warrant or other judi-
cial authorization.19 
The report recommended that the federal government implement similar requirements on 
the national level.20 
Although the focus of the report was personal data outsourced by the public sector, the 
report recommended that the “government of British Columbia and the government of Canada 
should consider and address the implications of the USA Patriot Act for the security of personal 
information that is entrusted to private sector custody or control in British Columbia or else-
where in Canada.”21 
Finally, the report recommended that “Canada should, in consultation with the provincial 
and territorial governments, advocate to the US and Mexico for comprehensive transnational 
data protection standards and for multilateral agreements respecting continental control and 
oversight of transnational information sharing for government purposes, including national secu-
rity and public safety purposes.”22 
Response to the British Columbia Report 
The government of British Columbia did not wait for the Information and Privacy Com-
missioner’s report to be published before taking action.  In October 2004 the Legislative Assem-
                                                 
17 Id. at 135 (Rec. 1(d)). 
18 Id. (Recs. 1(b) and 1(g)). 
19 Id. (Rec. 1(f)). 
20 Id. at 137-38 (Recs. 7, 8, 11). 
21 Id. at 139 (Rec. 13) (emphasis added). 
22 Id. at 140 (Rec. 16). 
  4 
bly adopted Bill 73—the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Amendment Act, 
2004.23 
The new law anticipated many of the recommendations that were subsequently to appear 
in the Commissioner’s report.  Specifically, the law requires each public body to ensure that 
“personal information in its custody or under its control is stored only in Canada and accessed 
only in Canada.”24  The law provides only two exceptions.  Personal information may be ex-
ported or accessed from outside of Canada with the consent of the data subject or “for the pur-
pose of disclosure allowed under [FOIPPA].”25  The disclosures allowed under FOIPPA include 
those required or authorized by other British Columbian or Canadian laws; required or author-
ized by “treaty, arrangement or agreement”; to government officials and bodies for specified 
uses; to satisfy a debt owed to or by the government; “for the purposes of licensing, registration, 
insurance, investigation or discipline of persons regulated inside or outside Canada by governing 
bodies of professions and occupations;” if “compelling circumstances exist that affect anyone’s 
health or safety”; and “to a law enforcement agency in a foreign country under an arrangement, a 
written agreement, a treaty or provincial or Canadian legislative authority.”26  In addition, the 
law allows the “minister responsible for this Act” to “by order, allow disclosure outside Canada . 
. . in specific cases or specified circumstances, subject to any restrictions or conditions that the 
minister considers advisable.”27 
The law requires a public body or its service provider to notify “the minister responsible 
for this Act” if it receives “a foreign demand” for personal information, if it receives a request 
for disclosure that “it has reason to suspect” is for disclosure outside of Canada, or if it “has rea-
son to suspect that unauthorized disclosure of personal information has occurred in response to a 
foreign demand for disclosure.”28 
Finally, the new law explicitly applies the provisions of FOIPPA restricting disclosure of 
personal information to service providers and their employees.29 
The Canadian government also did not wait for the British Columbia Commissioner’s re-
port before issuing a directive to all federal departments last October to conduct a “comprehen-
sive assessment of risks” to Canadians’ personal information provided to U.S. companies carry-
ing out work under contract.  The Canadian federal Treasury Board is also leading a working 
                                                 
23 Bill 73—the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Amendment Act, 2004. 
24 Id. § 30.1. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. §§ 33.1(1)-(2). 
27 Id. § 33.1(3). 
28 Id. § 30.2(2). 
29 Id. § 30.4. 
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group developing contract clauses to be used in future government requests for proposals and 
outsourcing contracts.30 
Federal Privacy Commissioner Jennifer Stoddart has indicated that she shares the con-
cerns voiced in the British Columbia report.31  To date, she has not sought to amend Canadian 
federal law to follow the British Columbia approach.  However, already, as discussed in greater 
detail below, multinational companies with offices in the United States are reporting stringent 
new terms being added to Canadian and provincial government outsourcing contracts forbidding 
personal data from being transferred to, or accessed from, the United States. 
There are signs that other countries outside of Canada are concerned as well.  South Aus-
tralia has begun an examination of the potential impact of the USA Patriot Act on outsourcing 
arrangements involving the personal information of that state’s residents. 
European Union officials have long expressed concern over U.S. government access to 
Europeans’ data, most recently in the context of U.S. requirements that airlines provide informa-
tion on all passengers on flights to the United States in advance of their arrival.  The European 
Court of Justice is currently reviewing a 2004 case brought by the European Union Parliament 
claiming that the transfer of European passenger records to the United States violates EU law.32  
The British Columbia report has prompted European government officials to promise renewed 
attention to potential access by the U.S. government to data about Europeans. 
The Report’s Flaws 
The British Columbia report, however well-intentioned, is seriously flawed, and has con-
tributed to misfocusing the growing debate over privacy issues in multinational information 
flows.  Ten issues are of particular concern: 
1. The report ignores the near impossibility of the USA Patriot Act being used to ob-
tain outsourced information about Canadians 
In his report, Commissioner Loukidellis concludes that “there are no assurances that the 
FIS Court [the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] will not grant orders compelling 
                                                 
30 Appearance of the President of the Treasury Board before the Special Senate Committee on the Anti-
terrorism Act (May 30, 2005). 
31 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Privacy Commissioner of Canada Commends BC In-
formation and Privacy Commissioner for Furthering Public Debate on Sharing of Personal Information about Cana-
dians across Borders (Oct. 29, 2004). 
32 Martial Tardy, “Euro Parliament Attempts New Legal Action Against PNR Deal,” Aviation Daily, 
June 18, 2004, at 3. 
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US-linked companies to disclose personal information records located in Canada.”33  He contin-
ues: “The existence of that reasonable possibility warrants other mitigating steps being taken.”34 
This conclusion is surprising for a number of reasons.  First, it transforms “no assur-
ances” into a “reasonable possibility” without explanation or comment. 
Second, it is contrary to the submissions to the Commissioner from the Attorney General 
of British Columbia and from other legal authorities, all of whom opined that there was little if 
any possibility of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issuing such an order.  Attorney 
General Geoff Plant characterized the “risk of access to Canadian information under the Patriot 
Act” as “minimal.”35  Martin Kratz, head of the Technology Law Practice Group of the Canadian 
law firm of Bennett Jones LLP, provided an opinion letter describing such access as “highly 
unlikely.”36  Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the National Security Agency, a partner in 
the U.S. law firm of Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, and, as of July 14, 2005, President Bush’s nomi-
nee as assistant secretary for policy of the Department of Homeland Security, concluded that 
U.S. law “effectively prevents U.S. authorities from obtaining the personal information of British 
Columbians without the consent of Canadian authorities or in violation of Canadian law and pol-
icy.”37  The possibility of such access, Baker concluded, is “vanishingly small” and “utterly im-
plausible.”38 
Third, the Commissioner’s conclusion ignores the evidence about the use of the USA Pa-
triot Act.  As of September 2003, not one section 215 order had been sought or issued in the al-
most two years since the Act had expanded the scope of those orders.39  Since then, according to 
the April 27, 2005, testimony of the U.S. Attorney General, section 215 has been used only 35 
times and never to obtain medical records.40  It is simply not credible to believe, as the British 
Columbia Commissioner asserts, that the use of such a provision to obtain data from Canada is a 
“reasonable possibility.” 
                                                 
33 Privacy and the USA Patriot Act, supra at 129. 
34 Id. 
35 The Hon. Geoff Plant, Attorney General of the Province of British Columbia, Submission to the 
Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia ¶ 4.08 (2004). 
36 Ross Breckon, Vice President of EDS Canada Inc., EDS Canada Submission on the USA Patriot Act at 
21 (2004) (letter from Martin Kratz, Bennett Jones LLP, to Ross Breckon, July 19, 2004). 
37 Id. at 24 (letter from Stewart A. Baker, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, to Ross Breckon, July 19, 2004). 
38 Id. at 29, 35 (letter from Stewart A. Baker). 
39 Richard B. Schmitt, “Ashcroft Says Patriot Act’s Search Clause was Never Used,” Los Angeles Times, 
Sept. 19, 2003, at A30. 
40 Hearing on the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Cong., Wash-
ington, DC, April 27, 2005 (testimony of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales). 
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Finally, the report discounts the impact of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, which 
governs the transborder collection of information between Canada and the United States.41  The 
countries signed the treaty in 1985 largely in response to concerns about the use of U.S. subpoe-
nas to obtain access to data in Canada.  Under the treaty, as the British Columbia Attorney Gen-
eral informed the Commissioner, “U.S. authorities must first try to obtain records located in Can-
ada through the assistance of Canadian authorities.”42  Article IV states that “[a] Party seeking to 
obtain documents, records or other articles known to be located in the territory of the other Party 
shall request assistance pursuant to the provisions of this Treaty,” except when the parties other-
wise agree.43  The United States understood and acknowledged this requirement in the Senate 
report that accompanied the treaty when it was ratified: “a Party needing documents, records, or 
articles located in the territory of the other and not available under any cooperative agreement or 
arrangement must use the treaty to obtain them.”44  The use of the USA Patriot Act or any other 
provision of U.S. law to obtain records located in Canada without first seeking access through 
the treaty is prohibited.45 
2. The report ignores the exceptions in British Columbian privacy law 
Even in the highly unlikely event that the U.S. government sought to use the USA Patriot 
Act to obtain access to personal information concerning British Columbia residents from U.S.-
linked companies, it is not at all clear that this would violate British Columbian law.  The Com-
missioner’s report’s conclusion to the contrary is unsupported by law. 
The version of FOIPPA in effect at the time the report was written provided specific con-
ditions under which the government could—in fact, might be required to—disclose personal in-
formation within its control.  Those exemptions included “for the purpose of complying with a 
subpoena, warrant, or order issued by a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the 
production of the information.”46  The Commissioner’s report concludes that this exemption ap-
plies only to a Canadian—or perhaps even only to a British Columbian—”court, person or 
body,” but the exemption certainly does not say so, the report cites to no legislative history sup-
porting this interpretation, and no decision by the British Columbia Information and Privacy 
                                                 
41 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between United States and Canada, reprinted in S. Treaty Doc. 100-
14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
42 The Hon. Geoff Plant, supra ¶ 2.07. 
43 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, supra art. iv. 
44 Senate Report, Treaty with Canada on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, reprinted in S. 
Treaty Doc. 100-14, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). 
45 The British Columbia report acknowledges the existence of the Treaty, but concludes that because it 
only applies to requests for assistance in relation to the investigation or prosecution of an “offence,” it would not 
apply to “intelligence gathering or surveillance where no investigation or prosecution of an ‘offence’ is involved.”  
Privacy and the USA Patriot Act, supra at 102.  Under U.S. law, section 215 orders can only be issued as part of “an 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,” both of which constitute 
offenses under U.S. and Canadian law. Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215. It therefore seems unlikely that U.S. authorities 
would be able to invoke section 215 without also triggering the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. 
46 FOIPPA, supra § 33 (e).  
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Commissioner has ever described the provision in this restrictive light.  The broad, inclusive lan-
guage of the exemption, especially when viewed in the context of the other exemptions, is more 
logically read as applying to a “subpoena, warrant, or order” issued by any “court, person or 
body with jurisdiction to compel the production of the information.” 
After the Commissioner’s report was written, British Columbia amended the FOIPPA to 
limit disclosure “to comply with a subpoena, warrant or order” only to those “issued or made by 
a court, person or body in Canada with jurisdiction to compel the production of information.”47  
This amendment suggests that the prior version of FOIPPA had not been limited to Canadian 
subpoenas, warrants, or orders. 
The version of FOIPPA in effect while the Commissioner was writing also permitted dis-
closure “to a law enforcement agency in a foreign country under an arrangement, written agree-
ment, treaty or legislative authority.”48  This would have permitted the United States to seek in-
formation through the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty or other treaty or agreement, and might 
well be read as permitting access under the USA Patriot Act—a U.S. “legislative authority.”  The 
British Columbia legislature lent credence to this interpretation when it subsequently amended 
the provision to restrict it “to a law enforcement agency in a foreign country under an arrange-
ment, a written agreement, a treaty or provincial or Canadian legislative authority,” and even 
then only by a “public body that is a law enforcement agency.”49  At the same time, by anticipat-
ing the changes recommended by the report in the FOIPPA amendments, the British Columbia 
legislature heightened the movement towards provincial restrictions on global information flows. 
3. The report ignores the concept of “reasonableness” enshrined in British Columbian 
and Canadian law 
Privacy, even in British Columbia, is not protected absolutely.  FOIPPA requires only 
that the government make “reasonable security arrangements against such risks as unauthorized 
access, collection, use, disclosure or disposal” of personal information under its control.50  In 
fact, the term “reasonable” appears 17 times in the law. 
In its decision rejecting the union’s suit against outsourcing administration of British Co-
lumbia’s public sector health services, the provincial Supreme Court stressed the importance of 
the reasonableness requirement: 
The importance of the right to privacy . . . cannot be minimized.  Those 
fundamental rights are contained in the Charter for the benefit of all Canadians.  
However, those rights, as previously stated, are not absolute.  There is a reason-
able expectation of privacy and the language [of the Charter] emphasizes that in-
                                                 
47 Id. § 33.2(b) (emphasis added). 
48 Id. § 33 (o). 
49 Id. § 33.1(2) (emphasis added). 
50 Id. § 30 (emphasis added). 
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dividuals should be secure against unreasonable search and seizure.  In the case at 
bar . . . . [t]he reasonable expectations of privacy are satisfied by statute and by 
contract. . . . A reasonable expectation of privacy is protected.51 
The British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner’s report ignores this rea-
sonableness requirement by seeking to impose obligations on the government to guard against 
any unauthorized access.  As a result, in the Commissioner’s view, even the slightest risk of the 
U.S. government seeking access to Canadian data through section 215 or other means appears to 
be too much.  This creates an impossible barrier to reconciling national data protection regimes 
and an unworkable approach to privacy and therefore undermines both meaningful privacy pro-
tection and multinational information flows. 
This also undervalues the important competing values that may conflict with information 
privacy.  David Flaherty, the previous British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner 
and a leading scholar of privacy law, has stressed the need for balance in privacy protection in 
many of his writings, including a 1998 report on the British Columbia Cancer Agency: “[F]air 
information practices need to be consciously fashioned, by written policies, to the needs of pub-
lic bodies and their clientele to deliver services effectively.  Privacy protection is all about bal-
ancing competing interests.”52 
4. The report focuses on privacy and downplays security 
One of the vital competing interests that the report downplays is the security of Canada 
and the United States.  This is surprising because it is impossible to balance privacy with com-
peting interests, or to determine whether a potential incursion into privacy is justified, without 
knowing why the data are necessary. 
Section 215, by its own terms, is limited to an investigation “to protect against interna-
tional terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”53  On September 11, 2001, and in the days 
afterwards, the world learned something about the reality and magnitude of the threat of interna-
tional terrorism.  In the words of noted U.S. attorney and civil liberties advocate Floyd Abrams: 
The threat of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks within the United 
States by terrorists who are, at one and the same time, technologically skilled and 
suicidally oriented, may well pose the greatest threat to our people that we have 
ever faced before.  The threat is not only real; it is long-term in nature, with no 
end in sight and, quite possibly, with no end at all.  It may be the fate of our chil-
dren and grandchildren always to be at risk. 
                                                 
51 BC Government & Service Employees’ Union v. British Columbia (Minister of Health Services), 2005 
B.C.S.C. 446 ¶¶ 68-70 (appeal pending) (emphasis added). 
52 Information and Privacy Commissioner of British Columbia, The British Columbia Cancer Agency: 
The Results of a Privacy Check-Up (1998). 
53 Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215. 
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Given the level of this threat, it is not only understandable but necessary 
that our government seek out new and creative ways to prevent acts of terrorism.54 
As post-September 11 amendments to Canadian laws have demonstrated, the Canadian 
government, like that of the United States, recognizes that some personal information will be 
necessary to protect against terrorist threats and secure critical infrastructures, such as the air-
ways and national borders.  Other nations have adopted similar laws to enhance national security.  
By focusing more on privacy than security, the report seriously undermines its conclusions about 
how the demand for privacy should be balanced against the need for the information. 
Moreover, a more reasonable examination of the statutorily provided purpose for which 
section 215 may be used to access information might have led the Commissioner to recognize 
how unlikely it was that the U.S. government would invoke section 215 to obtain access to Brit-
ish Columbia’s public health payment and administration records.  As Stewart Baker wrote in his 
opinion letter: “it is hard to imagine a set of facts under which investigators could persuade the 
FIS Court [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court] that any British Columbian health records—
let alone an entire database—are relevant to an investigation to protect against international ter-
rorism or clandestine intelligence activities.  The request would not withstand judicial review.”55 
5. The report focuses on the USA Patriot Act, despite the reality that other longstand-
ing legal provisions are far more likely to provide foreign government access to Ca-
nadian data 
One of the ironies of the British Columbia report and the debate it has created is the focus 
on the USA Patriot Act, and especially section 215.  While the Act is comparatively new and 
therefore perhaps more likely to be newsworthy, it is far less likely to be used as an effective tool 
to obtain access to Canadians’ data than other provisions of U.S. and other nations’ laws.  In fact, 
while the most recent data available indicates that section 215—the focus of the British Colum-
bia report—is rarely used to obtain access to anyone’s data, other tools such as National Security 
Letters, administrative subpoenas, and grand jury subpoenas are routinely used to obtain personal 
information including data held in other countries.  Moreover, like section 215 orders, these are 
usually issued and executed in secret, but unlike those orders, these do not all require the in-
volvement of a court. 
While the details of these other provisions are beyond the scope of this document, their 
existence and track record of use as means of obtaining data from abroad are critical for three 
reasons.  First, they remind us that the issue at the heart of the British Columbia report is not 
new.  It has been dealt with by Canada, the United States, and other nations for decades and, in 
fact, it was concern about how data were being accessed that led to adoption of the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty in 1985—20 years ago. 
                                                 
54 U.S. Department of Defense, Technology and Privacy Advisory Committee, Safeguarding Privacy in 
the Fight Against Terrorism 63 (2004) (separate statement of Floyd Abrams). 
55 EDS Canada Submission on the USA Patriot Act, supra at 28 (letter of Stewart A. Baker). 
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Second, not only are these issues not new, they are not limited to U.S. law either.  Can-
ada, too, like many other countries, has legal provisions for issuing subpoenas and other judicial 
orders to collect and disclose personal information, even across national borders.  We have al-
ready seen the exceptions to FOIPPA for complying “with a subpoena, warrant or order” and to 
allow Canadian law enforcement agencies to disclose personal information to foreign law en-
forcement agencies “under an arrangement, a written agreement, a treaty or provincial or Cana-
dian legislative authority.”56  A neutral reading of the British Columbia report and law would 
affect most global businesses because of their inevitable links to one or more of the dozens of 
countries with laws permitting government access to personal data, under limited circumstances, 
for national security purposes. 
Canada and the United States have for years sought personal information from each 
other’s territories, shared information across their borders, and negotiated when efforts to obtain 
that information conflicted with the values of either nation.  Moreover, like the United States, 
Canada amended its federal laws post-September 11 to expand the power of the government to 
collect and disclose information regarding its citizens.57  In fact, Michael Geist, Canada Research 
Chair in Internet and E-Commerce Law at the University of Ottawa Faculty of Law, noted in his 
submission to the British Columbia Commissioner that section 21 of the Canadian Security Intel-
ligence Act is remarkably similar to section 215 of the USA Patriot Act.  Both provide for war-
rants to be issued in secret by federal courts empowering law enforcement officials to seize tan-
gible things.58 
Finally, the existence of these other tools reminds us that the issues surrounding transbor-
der access to personal information are not likely to go away any time soon.  Even if section 215 
is not the threat the British Columbia report portrays it to be, the issues raised by the discussion 
of section 215 remain relevant and timely. 
6. The report fails to define “US-linked” and “US-located” companies and then focuses 
exclusively on U.S. companies with Canadian subsidiaries 
The British Columbia report focuses on a single group of service providers: “US-linked” 
or “US-located” companies, terms the report uses 40 times.  Despite the obvious importance of 
these terms, they are never defined.  A careful reading, however, shows that the report is focused 
only on U.S. companies doing business in Canada or with Canadian subsidiaries, as if only such 
companies present the USA Patriot Act issues that the report fears.  For example, every time the 
report refers to parent-subsidiary relationships the parent is a U.S. company and the subsidiary is 
Canadian.  The implication is that U.S. companies and their Canadian subsidiaries are uniquely 
vulnerable to the USA Patriot Act.  For example, the report notes that “[a]s long as the court has 
jurisdiction over a US corporation that controls records located abroad, the court can order dis-
                                                 
56 FOIPPA, supra §§ 33.2(b), 33.1(2). 
57 See, e.g., An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Bio-
logical and Toxic Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety, SC 2004, C.15. 
58 Michael Geist & Milana Homsi, The Long Arm of the USA Patriot Act: A Threat to Canadian Pri-
vacy? 24 (2004). 
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closure.”59  But exactly the same thing can be said of a Canadian corporation: as long as a U.S. 
court has jurisdiction, it can order disclosure even of records located abroad. 
The threat that the USA Patriot Act presents to data about Canadians, slight though it is, 
is shared equally by any entity—Canadian or U.S.—with ties to the United States.  Those ties 
could be a U.S. office, a U.S. parent, a U.S. subsidiary, a U.S. consultant, or a U.S. service pro-
vider.  The Attorney General of British Columbia, for example, noted that whatever risks exist 
under the USA Patriot Act, they exist equally for “Canadian companies with U.S. connections,” 
“Canadian airlines,” “Canadian or British Columbian unions that have connections with U.S. un-
ions,” Canadian retail companies with U.S. connections,” and “Canadian internet service provid-
ers with U.S. connections.”60 
Similarly, Professor Geist wrote: 
Moreover, the application of these laws is not limited to U.S. companies 
but actually applies to any company with sufficient U.S. connections such that it 
could find itself subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts.  This is true both for 
U.S. companies operating subsidiaries in foreign countries as well as for foreign 
companies with U.S. subsidiaries.61 
The restrictions, then, that the report would impose on U.S. companies and their Cana-
dian subsidiaries, to be effective, would need to apply equally to all Canadian companies with 
U.S. connections, whatever their form.  Multiplied across the global context, those restrictions 
would have to apply to virtually all non-Canadian companies with Canadian operations and Ca-
nadian companies with non-Canadian operations—an extraordinary impediment to global infor-
mation flows and trade in information services, as discussed in greater detail below. 
7. The report substitutes sovereignty for privacy 
Although the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner’s report is osten-
sibly about privacy, is appears to be equally concerned with sovereignty.  For example, the report 
notes that “there is indeed a distinction, in terms of national sovereignty and protection of per-
sonal privacy, between disclosure of information to Canadian governments and to a foreign gov-
ernment.”62  The report also concludes that “[u]sing the long arm of the USA Patriot Act to ex-
tend American legislation and American principles onto foreign soil . . . . offends our basic un-
derstanding of sovereignty.”63 
                                                 
59 Privacy and the USA Patriot Act, supra at 119. 
60 The Hon. Geoff Plant, supra ¶ 9.02. 
61 Geist & Homsi, supra at 34. 
62 Privacy and the USA Patriot Act, supra at 82. 
63 Id. at 88 (quoting Submission of Public Services International 2 (July 14, 2004)). 
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Sovereignty is, of course, very important, but its prominence in the report is noteworthy 
given that the report is ostensibly about privacy and emanates from an independent government 
office concerned with privacy and access to information.  That lack of experience with issues 
involving sovereignty may help explain the nationalist way in which the term is used in the re-
port. 
The report notes in passing that Canada has adopted provisions similar to those contained 
in the USA Patriot Act and that both Canadian and British Columbian laws expressly permit col-
lecting data for national security and law enforcement purposes, but it draws the line at the U.S. 
government engaging in similar activities.  Moreover, the report presumes that U.S. government 
officials would not seek information in a straightforward manner from their Canadian counter-
parts and pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, even though the only examples of fail-
ing to follow privacy law to which the report cites are Canadian.  The report refers repeatedly to 
the “rule of law” and its paramount importance in a democratic society, but then intimates that it 
only works in Canada.  In fact, the report goes so far as to make recommendations that could 
cause U.S. companies with Canadian connections to violate the “rule of law” in the United 
States.64 
Faced with the similarities between the national security threats, the legitimate need for 
information, and the importance of the rule of law in Canada, the United States, and other na-
tions, the report might very well have concluded that sovereign nations must find a principled 
way of accommodating their mutual needs when they affect the transborder flow of information.  
Instead, the report opted for protecting the rule of law and sovereignty in Canada without regard 
for the impact elsewhere. 
8. The report recommends a provincial solution to a global issue 
Faced with a fundamentally global problem about the inevitable conflict between national 
legal systems when applied to global information flows, the British Columbia report takes a sur-
prising turn by focusing on a provincial approach.  This might be explained partially by the fact 
that the British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner is an independent office of a 
provincial government, but, at least as a near-term step, the report actually seems to advocate a 
local approach to national and global issues. 
In discussing the scope of exemption 33(e) under the FOIPPA, permitting disclosures of 
personal information “for the purpose of complying with a subpoena, warrant, or order issued by 
a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of the information,” the report 
concludes that “with jurisdiction” would include only subpoenas, warrants, or orders issued “in 
British Columbia or possibly elsewhere in Canada,” but in no event “under the authority of a 
provincial law of another province.”65  This doubt as to whether British Columbia would recog-
nize subpoenas, warrants, or orders issued by Canadian federal courts, combined with a firm re-
sistance to recognizing such documents issued by other provincial courts, is striking. 
                                                 
64 Id. at 135 (Rec. 1(d)). 
65 Id. at 107 (emphasis added). 
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In the face of the report’s conclusion that the law of no Canadian province other than 
British Columbia could ever be sufficient to “authorize” disclosure under section 30 or 33, and 
that only “possibly” might federal Canadian law suffice, it is clear that U.S. law and the laws of 
other sovereign nations never had a chance.  In short, the report articulates a view of British Co-
lumbia, at least for privacy purposes, as a legal island, separated not only from other countries 
but from other provinces as well.  This stands in stark contrast to the growing reliance over the 
past two decades on supra-national regional political institutions, such as the European Union, 
the North American Free Trade Area, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
9. The report highlights vital issues, but fails to address them meaningfully 
The British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner’s report on privacy and the 
USA Patriot Act highlights two important sets of issues.  The first concerns how to balance pri-
vacy with security.  This is a question that all developed countries are facing and will undoubt-
edly continue to face for the foreseeable future.  The second set of issues concerns how to deal 
with divergent national legal systems that increasingly come into conflict as data move across 
national borders.  This is by no means a new concern, but global information technologies, like 
the World Wide Web, and the multinational commerce, outsourcing, and information sharing 
they have made possible are causing new and frequent conflicts between divergent approaches to 
privacy and information management. 
The British Columbia report focuses new attention on both sets of issues, but then adopts 
a nationalistic (even provincial), authoritarian solution that asserts the primacy of the law of one 
province over that of all other nations.  This approach may work, at least temporarily, for Canada 
or British Columbia, but it is no solution.  The report recommends, and the British Columbia leg-
islature contemporaneously adopted, requirements that prevent transmitting or even accessing 
personal data held by the public sector from outside of Canada.  As a practical matter, only busi-
nesses incorporated in British Columbia can even bid on outsourcing contracts involving per-
sonal data. 
In the case of the British Columbia health benefits administration contract, the govern-
ment ultimately granted the contract to Maximus BC Health Benefit Operations Inc., a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Maximus BC Health, which in turn is owned by Maximus Canada Inc., 
which is owned by Maximus Inc., a U.S. company.  Even these four levels of separation were not 
sufficient for the British Columbia government, which required that the stock of Maximus BC 
Health be placed in a trust, with instructions that the shares are handed over to the government if 
Maximus BC Health fails to abide by the terms of the service contract.  In addition, Maximus 
agreed to pay a stipulated $35 million penalty if it breached the confidentiality provisions in the 
contract.66 
This is simply not a workable approach for the information age.  It denies the efficiencies 
and economies of scale that global information networks make possible.  By adopting this ap-
                                                 
66 BCGSEU v. British Columbia, supra. 
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proach, the report misses a valuable opportunity to have advanced our thinking about vexing but 
critical issues, rather than merely our awareness of them. 
10. The report’s recommendations pose real threats to individuals and businesses in 
Canada and elsewhere 
The ability to move information across borders offers real benefits to individuals and real 
opportunities to businesses.  Customer service can be provided around the clock without em-
ployees having to work through the night and without companies having to pay overtime.  Effi-
ciencies and specialization that global information networks support expand the range of prod-
ucts and services available to consumers and reduce the prices consumers pay for them.  The 
ability to access data from abroad decreases the need for redundant sales and service forces, fur-
ther reducing costs.  It increases the mobility of labor and facilitates travel and commerce across 
borders. 
The British Columbia report and legislation are already having significant effects on in-
dividuals and businesses in both public and private sectors in Canada and elsewhere.67  For ex-
ample, the requirement that personal data not be transferred out of British Columbia eliminates 
the ability of businesses to provide centralized data storage, back-up, or processing.  One of the 
world’s largest issuers of affinity credit cards has been told that it can no longer service cards 
provided to support public sector institutions in British Columbia, such as public universities, 
from anywhere other than British Columbia.  This not only eliminates important efficiencies and 
drives up the cost of providing services, it will likely eliminate some services and competition 
from some service providers altogether because of the economic impossibility of creating data 
centers just for British Columbia. 
The inability to move public sector data outside of the province also greatly restricts the 
ability of service providers to match those data with information from other sources in an effort 
to identify fraud, protect national security, trace missing persons, enhance the accuracy of re-
cords, or provide more personalized service.  Such matching will only be possible with data that 
can be moved to British Columbia, which may be impossible for economic reasons or legal pro-
hibitions as other provinces, states, and nations adopt similarly restrictive laws. 
Video conferencing, Internet-based meeting services, even the routing of telephone and 
Internet traffic (which often is done through the United States to take advantage of lower tariff 
rates) will be restricted at least in the public sector if they involve sending personal information 
outside of the province. 
The requirement that personal data from British Columbia’s public sector not even be ac-
cessible outside of the province exacerbates these concerns and adds new ones.  For example, 
non-British Columbia call centers that provide service, instruction, or other support are impossi-
ble if they involve personal data.  As a result, the increasingly common practice of providing 
                                                 
67 The examples in this section are extracted from confidential information provided to the author by 
member companies of the Center for Information Policy Leadership that operate in Canada. 
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benefits information and options on a 24x7x365 basis using foreign call centers and Internet ser-
vice providers is prohibited because these require that the foreign operations have access to per-
sonal data. 
The absolute prohibitions recommended in the British Columbia report and contained in 
the amended law restrict even incidental links to provincial data from outside the country.  For 
example, manufacturers of medical imaging and other diagnostic equipment have been informed 
that they can no longer provide remote service because such service inevitably involves the tech-
nician temporarily accessing patient information.  As a result, the prices for equipment provided 
to British Columbia hospitals, which operate in the public sector, are anticipated to rise 10-15 
percent just to cover the additional costs of servicing it.  Moreover, suppliers are warning of sub-
stantial delays to allow time for senior technicians to be flown into British Columbia since they 
cannot consult about maintenance issues from outside of the province.  Patient care and conven-
ience are certain to suffer, all to protect against the USA Patriot Act being used to access patient 
data that might be stored in a malfunctioning piece of equipment.  The same will be true of war-
ranty service, computer support, and similar services that cannot be provided remotely because 
of the likelihood that personal information might be disclosed during the transaction. 
The British Columbia report and legislation pose special challenges for multinational or-
ganizations, which can no longer take advantage of the efficiencies of their size and structure to 
provide centralized computer support, payroll processing, hiring and promotion evaluation, risk 
management, or even internal audit if personal information from the public sector would be in-
volved. 
In addition to the restrictions on transferring data or accessing it from outside of British 
Columbia, the report and legislation include other requirements that are being implemented and 
often amplified in practice.  For example, non-British Columbian companies are being required 
to create separate British Columbian subsidiaries and then to take extraordinary steps to separate 
those entities from Canadian or U.S. parent companies.  This is an expensive and burdensome 
process that can result in enormous inefficiencies as well as significant risk to the parent com-
pany because of its inability to oversee its subsidiaries effectively. 
The requirement that service providers notify the provincial government if any non-
British Columbia government agency seeks access to data creates a real dilemma for affected 
businesses.  For example, a Canadian company that receives a subpoena under either Canadian 
or U.S. law is likely to be prohibited by the terms of subpoena from disclosing its existence to 
anyone other than its counsel.  However, if that subpoena concerns personal information that has 
been obtained from, or is being processed for, a British Columbia government agency, provincial 
law requires that the company disclose the existence of the subpoena or face stiff civil and even 
criminal penalties for failing to do so.  Neither the Information and Privacy Commissioner’s re-
port nor the British Columbia law permits any exceptions, even for compliance with other legal 
obligations. 
Increasingly multinational businesses are finding that service contracts and outsourcing 
agreements with British Columbia government agencies are including harsh stipulated penalties 
for disclosing information in violation of the contract, even if the violation was inadvertent, re-
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sulted in no tangible harm, or was compelled by a higher law.  Provisions for stipulated penalties 
such as the $35 million that Maximus faces will inevitably cause some companies to stop doing 
business with the province and may well result in subjecting those that do continue to work in 
British Columbia to unconscionable punishment.  Moreover, such penalty provisions threaten to 
distort the market if they are required only of entities owned by companies outside of British Co-
lumbia. 
British Columbia public agencies are also including in service contracts provisions pro-
hibiting the involvement of U.S. employees of service providers or condition their involvement 
on prior agency permission.  This wreaks havoc on a business’ ability to manage its work force 
and deliver the best service at the lowest cost possible.  It can interfere with union contracts and 
succession planning, and it denies British Columbian residents and government the benefit of 
access to the best talent available. 
These and other risks are not just conjecture.  Already we are seeing the impact of the 
British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner’s report and the related legislation re-
flected in onerous contract terms and the exclusion of U.S. and other non-British Columbian en-
terprises from the opportunity to bid on government contracts.  As serious as these restrictions 
are, the greater risk is that they spread. 
The Future Threat 
The British Columbia report and law are only a start.  They and other developments and 
concerns are causing ripples throughout Canada and in other countries.  As we have seen, the 
Canadian federal government has issued a directive to all federal departments to conduct a 
“comprehensive assessment of risks” to Canadians’ personal information provided to U.S. com-
panies carrying out work under contract.  The Canadian federal Treasury Board is also leading a 
working group developing contract clauses to be used in future government requests for propos-
als and outsourcing contracts.  And other Canadian provinces are watching the experience with 
the British Columbia law to see whether they should adopt similar restrictions.  In the meantime, 
individual federal and provincial government agencies are adding stringent new terms to out-
sourcing contracts with multinational companies with offices in the United States, forbidding 
personal data from being transferred to, or accessed from, the United States. 
The risk that British Columbia-style laws will spread throughout Canada was heightened 
by a March 2005 survey showing that 92 percent of Canadians surveyed have moderate or high 
concern that Canadian government agencies will outsource processing of personal data to com-
panies in the United States.68  Ninety-two percent believe that they should receive notice of such 
transfers, and 94 percent consider it of moderate or high importance that such transfers be condi-
tioned on individual consent.69 
                                                 
68 EKOS Research Associates, Canadians, Privacy, and Emerging Issues 12 (2005). 
69 Id. at 13-14. 
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The survey also provides a useful insight into the political environment in Canada and 
elsewhere surrounding transborder data flows.  The Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Jennifer 
Stoddart, who commissioned the survey, issued a press release entitled: “Majority of Canadians 
demand informed consent on cross-border sharing of their personal information.”70  The Com-
missioner neglected to note, however, that 90 percent of Canadians surveyed have moderate or 
high concern about Canadian government agencies outsourcing processing of personal data to 
companies in Canada; 94 percent want notice of such transfers; and the survey failed to ask 
whether Canadians thought such transfers should be conditioned on consent.71  Commissioner 
Stoddart issued a statement saying that the survey showed “[t]here is a growing lack of confi-
dence by Canadians in the protection of their personal information being transferred across bor-
ders” and calling on the government to “protect Canadians’ personal data in any outsourcing or 
contract arrangements with foreign governments or companies.”72  Her statement reflected only 
half of the story, however, because what the survey showed was that Canadians are equally con-
cerned about outsourcing of personal data in Canada, a fact overlooked in both the Commis-
sioner’s publicity efforts and the resulting press coverage of the survey. 
The risk is not only that unilateral restrictions spread throughout Canada, but that they are 
adopted by other countries and provinces either to emulate the British Columbia law or to retali-
ate against it.  South Australia has begun an examination of the potential impact of the USA Pa-
triot Act on outsourcing arrangements there.  European Union officials, who have long expressed 
concern over data flows to other countries in general and U.S. government access to European 
data in particular, are watching developments in British Columbia with great interest. 
Restrictions on public-sector data flows may be just the beginning.  If British Columbia-
style restrictions are portrayed as necessary to protect individuals’ data held by the public sector 
from access by the U.S. government during processing, wouldn’t similar restrictions be neces-
sary to protect data held by the private sector?  After all, unlike in the United States, data protec-
tion laws in Canada, Europe, and much of the rest of the world apply equally to public and pri-
vate sectors.  There is no bright dividing line. 
The British Columbia Information and Privacy Commissioner’s report explicitly recom-
mends that the “government of British Columbia and the government of Canada should consider 
and address the implications of the USA Patriot Act for the security of personal information that 
is entrusted to private sector custody or control in British Columbia or elsewhere in Canada.”73  
The restrictions on transferring or accessing personal data from abroad recommended by the 
Commissioner and enacted by the provincial legislature could spread from the public sector to 
the private sector. 
                                                 
70 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Majority of Canadians Demand Informed Consent on 
Cross-border Sharing of Their Personal Information (June 20, 2005). 
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Finally, it seems inevitable that if the British Columbian unilateral approach to transbor-
der data flows becomes more widespread, other provinces and nations will feel compelled to 
adopt similar or other data flow restrictions to protect local industry and ensure a level playing 
field.  Restrictions on transferring information to, or allowing it to be accessed from, other coun-
tries and special conditions on service providers with connections to other countries constitute 
barriers to trade and are likely to provoke retaliatory responses. 
This is the real risk: that the threat to multinational data flows posed by the British Co-
lumbia report and law spread across Canada, across sectors, and ultimately across the globe.  The 
harm to individuals and institutions of the British Columbia approach to data protection is al-
ready clear.  If magnified across provinces and nations, and applied to private- as well as public-
sector data processing, the impact could be extraordinary.  It will be measured not only in terms 
of economics and convenience, but jobs, health, and security.  Such a serious, multinational issue 
requires a serious, multinational response, not the unilateral, provincial legislation adopted by 
British Columbia. 
The critical issues highlighted by Commissioner Loukidellis’ report and the British Co-
lumbia law, and especially the question about how to deal with divergent national legal systems 
that increasingly come into conflict as data move across national borders, warrant serious, 
thoughtful consideration.  While the concerns are not new, powerful information technologies, 
global networks, and the multinational commerce, outsourcing, and information sharing they 
have made possible are inevitably going to cause new and more frequent conflicts between di-
vergent national (and provincial) approaches to privacy and information management.  Those 
same technologies and activities, our growing reliance on them, and the important values they 
implicate—including privacy and security—also heighten the urgency of finding multinational, 
diplomatic solutions that protect global information flows. 
 
